

### Dark future - a prognosis<sup>1</sup>

I. If one passes before one's mind examples of what is believed as a matter of course to be the object of art history, one finds behind the term *art* a great many varying things. The differences lie in the material, the formal, the dimensions, - they regard temporalness, motifs of pictures, motivations for them in each individual case etc.; and lastly, they are to be found in their contexts of realization.

A space/time construct contains worlds of aesthetic objects, i.e. of art. Though first categories must be created to create reality, and be it aesthetic reality, to define it one must inquire as to the criteria of such a process. We know of the hot controversies in the 7th/8th Century A.D., cradle of the occident and time of the "Bilderstreit", about the question as to what was to be considered an image. If we consider that Charles the Great as well as the Empress Irene interfered in the controversy, we learn that what we today unquestionably call art was at that time valued concerning its content and also politically. If, with regard to medieval art, we today speak of a political picture, we rather usually are accused of an irreverent view point. The judgement is no better if we speak of medieval *art* with regard to objects of daily use or, worse, of church furnishings (even then, if an altar painting and/or a devotional sculpture are meant). Hans Belting (Belting, 1990) presented an excellent paper on this topic which already in its title signals that "before the age of art" one could not speak of art. Why, one must ask, does one speak quite as a matter of course of medieval *art*, and not only do laymen speak of this. Certainly, we find several answers of which I should like to mention three possible ones:

The question of the ontological situation was neglected as compared to the superficial structuring of the field of action, the subjects of art history, such as chronology, style, work categories. This surprises even more as just those objects "before the age of art" did not at all form one ontologically homogeneous category and certainly cannot be viewed under ontological aspects to be invariant with objects of "the

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<sup>1</sup> The object of this paper is to link semiotics as developed around Max Bense and Elisabeth Walther, based on Ch. S. Peirce, and some observations of the development of art history as a science with observations of the development of art in the 20th Century.

age of art". What, in the Middle Ages, might have been an object "of delight but without utility"?

The *semantic rule* which says that reception orients itself within a frame, prior to all consciously started labor of thinking, prior to mental effort, is not only in effect since Marcel Duchamp's *Ready-made*. We observe the function of this *semantic rule* not only by way of placing "skilfully" selected trouvailles in museums, where they are perceived as art: in this case the museum is the "frame". We observe the effectiveness of this rule since art historians have chosen medieval cult objects to be subject of their science. The second step, then, was cogent, namely to bring medieval cult objects into the art museum to submit them to the criteria of the art museum as well as to scientific research and use as exhibits.

As I have elaborated in an earlier paper (Brög, 1988), the first placement of the first medieval cult object in an art museum was the first installation of a *Ready-made*. The traditional view of art science is quite different, as the third answer makes plain.

Art reflection took and takes place historically, formally, narratively, and was not at all directed toward the nucleus of the specificity of aesthetic objects, otherwise the ontological question would have been raised and answered. Belting's paper does not deal with art in "the age of art". And even the French philosopher and politician Victor Cousin with his demand in 1836 for "l'art pour l'art", bore no consequences as far as the radical search for the bases of aesthetics was concerned.

## II. Nouveau Réalisme implies "old" realisms

Indeed, with respect to medieval art one speaks, for example, of "detail realisms" to express that one wishes to have the whole but not the detail understood as realistic and classified as such. In this context one can hardly avoid comparison with the early collages of cubism. I refer to the fact that the wider context serves as a frame for estimation *en détail*. This has also to do with our rejection of medieval "surreal" paintings as surrealist, and with their possible acceptance as realistic, such as for example the leaves of Dürer's 'Apocalypse', which he made believing to illustrate a factual report.

In "Erkennen und Sein", Ynhui Park discusses that truth is a question of context and not of conformity, and he believes it to be relative to different perspectives and measures. (Park, 1988). In face of the semiotic fact that every sign is linked semiotically to predecessors and followers, it seems legitimate to transfer Park's claim to our problem generating from transplantation out of contexts or into contexts. *Ready-mades* of the Duchamp type are *transplantations*, as is Max Ernst's painting *La tentation de Saint Antoine*, where a medieval picture of hades is implanted into the surrealism of the 20th Century<sup>2</sup>.

But even the art which we primarily mean when speaking of *realism* without further specifications does not put it to the point. For Menzel, Courbet, Leibl, *realism* meant to confront the image of experienced reality, understood as reality, in a merely pictorial, artificial way with a most approximate imitation.<sup>3</sup>

The game is not to create reality, but to create a representing imitation of reality, a well-approximated iconism of reality. Only when materiality, already actual outside contexts of aesthetic use, was introduced into aesthetic usage, reality in art became a serious matter. The first step was taken with the *Papiers Collés* (1911/12). Here, authenticity of a picture world was claimed, which radically innovated art when seen from an ontological view point. The claim, which could be staked most compellingly by way of this art gambit, was one of aesthetic reality experienced with great emphasis through the semiotic classification of aesthetic objects. By way of the proven invariance of sign thematization and reality thematization 3.1 2.2 1.3 x 3.1 2.2 1.3 the demand for consideration of ontological aspects is convincingly put forth<sup>4</sup>.

### III. A rudimentary summary

At this point, short reference to some important elements (and their links) of semiotics, as developed around M. Bense and E. Walther, seems necessary. Signs and thus also works of art/aesthetic objects are seen as triadic realtionships. The sign

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<sup>2</sup> This painting belonging to the Wilhelm-Lehmbruck-Museum of the City of Duisburg was created in 1946 on the occasion of a contest held by the >Bel Ami International Competition<.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding A. Menzel's "Iron Forge", Peter Weiss (1976) discussed the problems to justify this painting as a realistic work.

<sup>4</sup> At this point one must refer to general semiotic literature on the basis of Ch. S. Peirce, as well as to some publications of a more specialized nature which serve to understand the topics of this paper: (Walther, 1974; Bense, 1975, 1976, 1983, 1986).

construct is based on the (also) triadic theory of fundamental categories of Peirce, the correlates of which are determined as Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness and have their correlation in the determinant units Medium, Object, Interpretant, which relate to each other. This may be demonstrated in this manner:





Fig. 1

- SR = Sign Relation
- M = Medium (material carrier)
- O = Object (sign related)
- I = Interpretant (interior and exterior - encoding and decoding consciousness)


The triad M, O, I experiences a triple, delicately structuring trichotomy:  
Medium relation (qualisign, sinsign, legisign),  
Object relation (icon, index, symbol),  
Interpretant relation (rhema, dicent, argument).

In addition to Fig. 1, we now observe Fig. 2:



- Qua = qualisign (quality)
- Sin = sinsign (singularity)
- Leg = legisign (legitimacy)
- Ic = icon (image)
- In = index (indication, reference)
- Sy = symbol (convention, agreement)
- Rhe = rhema (open connex; modal translation: possibility)
- Dic = dicent (closed connex; modal translation: reality or existence)
- Arg = argument (complete connex; modal translation: necessity).

Bense's numerical writing leads to the following sign scheme in categorial order.



A sign consists of a correlate of each trichotomy 1 (1.2.3), 2 (1.2.3), 3 (1.2.3).  
 With due regard for categorial order, 10 major sign categories may be combined:

|     |     |     |
|-----|-----|-----|
| 3.1 | 2.1 | 1.1 |
| 3.1 | 2.1 | 1.2 |
| 3.1 | 2.1 | 1.3 |
| 3.1 | 2.2 | 1.2 |
| 3.1 | 2.2 | 1.3 |
| 3.1 | 2.3 | 1.3 |
| 3.2 | 2.2 | 1.2 |
| 3.2 | 2.2 | 1.3 |
| 3.2 | 2.3 | 1.3 |
| 3.3 | 2.3 | 1.3 |

On account of the *sign's* special relationship to *being* (as system representing being), as is evident from the categorial determination of the sign, it is obvious that signs inhabit a continuum between ascending and descending semioticity. This is revealed particularly by employing the operation of the dualization (inversion) of the sign categories (sign thematics), introduced by Bense around 1975, by which each sign category, understood as thematization of signs, is matched with its corresponding thematic of reality. Formally, inversion takes place by arranging the correlates of the sign class/sign thematics from right to left while exchanging the numbers.

| sign class |            |            |   | thematics of reality |            |            |
|------------|------------|------------|---|----------------------|------------|------------|
| 3.1        | 2.1        | 1.1        | x | 1.1                  | 1.2        | 1.3        |
| 3.1        | 2.1        | 1.2        | x | 2.1                  | 1.2        | 1.3        |
| 3.1        | 2.1        | 1.3        | x | 3.1                  | 1.2        | 1.3        |
| 3.1        | 2.2        | 1.2        | x | 2.1                  | 2.2        | 1.3        |
| <u>3.1</u> | <u>2.2</u> | <u>1.3</u> | x | <u>3.1</u>           | <u>2.2</u> | <u>1.3</u> |
| 3.1        | 2.3        | 1.3        | x | 3.1                  | 3.2        | 1.3        |
| 3.2        | 2.2        | 1.2        | x | 2.1                  | 2.2        | 2.3        |
| 3.2        | 2.2        | 1.3        | x | 3.1                  | 2.2        | 2.3        |
| 3.2        | 2.3        | 1.3        | x | 3.1                  | 3.2        | 2.3        |
| 3.3        | 2.3        | 1.3        | x | 3.1                  | 3.2        | 3.3        |

It appears that the 5th sign class shows invariance with its thematics of reality even after inversion. This sign class was demonstrated by Bense to be the category of the "signs themselves", the "number as such", the "word as such", and the "aesthetic state as such". (Bense, 1988)

The early *Papiers Collés* by Braque and Picasso bring to light an art which cannot be determined appropriately by the use of stylistic categories, but by aesthetic categories, as happens in semiotical aesthetics, under constant correlative consideration of the ontic factor in determination and discussion of aesthetic conditions. Does this recognized fact entice Restany decades later to formulate the programmatic slogan: "A matter is that what it is" (Cladders, 1971)? Is this slogan already inherent to cubist activities? If it is claimed that Mondrian is the last link in a continuous chain since the Renaissance Era, then the break with the Renaissance Era by Braque and Picasso must also at least be considered<sup>5</sup>.

In 1913, Marcel Duchamp started a most intelligent experiment in consequence of the spearhead Braque/Picasso, which was supposed to settle the question as to how art is received. By disclosing this specific mode of communication, he intended to put the medium called art into another light. By exhibiting his *Ready-mades*, Duchamp not only exposed the mechanisms of art reception but also those of creation. Artificial skills were invalidated. The abilities to select and to expose were now among the most important creative factors.

What, really, is a *Ready-made*? It is important to define this. The insight, why aesthetic reception functioned the way we believe to know since Duchamp's experiment, depends on this definition. A *Ready-made* is something pre-made, pre-made in an originally non-aesthetic context, such as we previously found when regarding the implants of the *Papiers Collés*. *Ready-made* excludes any kind of uniqueness. No matter how it came about, if by machine, artificially, arbitrarily, calculatedly. A *Ready-made* must have high-frequency because, if it is to function as an object of art, it depends on the possession of a conventional meaning: The meaning of *Ready-mades* -- before they are thus named, and they only bear this name after they moved into the aesthetic context -- must be trivial and known to everyone. It is of interest to recall that after *Ready-mades* were accepted as works of art, the aspect of uniqueness in art which defined art in comparison to technical

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<sup>5</sup> Max Bense expressed this in his contribution to the Kahnweiler almanach by pointing out that with cubism digital coding took the place of analogical coding.

artefacts, had to be relinquished.<sup>6</sup> Certainly, and only then Duchamp's experiment gains sense, his *Ready-mades* were to be *things* which they are themselves and nothing else. Of course, the interpretation of them as art followed instantly. This leads to the conclusion that a *thing* once in a museum does not remain what it was before. It cannot be taken for granted that Restany did not know what happened to the *Ready-mades* and through them. But what, then, is the sense in claiming art and to say at the same time: "a thing is that what it is", i.e. to synonymize *thing* and art. The dilemma: alleged *things* within the context of *art* invariably generate to be art. If this is true, the lesson to be learned from Dada history is also an indiction of the lack of consideration in wishing to claim art as *thing*, quasi in inversion of Peirce's insight that any thing may be declared a sign. Can art be something which means only the thing which it is?<sup>7</sup>

It may be put aside whether the museum is really the most powerful, meaningful institution among the rivaling institutions. Indeed, the artists of Nouveau Réalisme could claim their *things* to be *things*, but they could not assert them successfully. The question whether art is a *thing* or only to be understood as a *thing* in one of its correlates, namely in the relation of medium, is totally irrelevant in practice and for practice, although certainly not in the development of semiotic or aesthetic theory. Not only should the *Papiers Collés* have led to basic ontological reflections in art history and, thus, also to the regarding of different object relations, i.e. to observations made under the aspect of the relationship of art objects to the rest of the world of extensional objects (Brög + Stiebing, 1980). Questions truly relevant to aesthetics were not, at least not relevantly, asked, i.e. not asked reasonably in such a way that they could have been answered within the frame of established science, and this although general semiotics and even semiotic aesthetics have been urging this

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<sup>6</sup> It was to be a long time before Walter Benjamin had written *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit*, Frankfurt/M. 1955. The related problem between photography and *Ready-mades* is discussed nowhere. In this context one must certainly also refer to the exhibits of technical museums; they generally become museum-pieces only once they have lost their function or at least are outmoded by their successors. This comparison shows that Duchamp's *Ready-mades* are no such thing, if one submits to the criteria of the technical museum: the liberty to make a *montage* of stool and bicycle handlebar could there not be taken, as it would not permit to exhibit a *urinal lying down* in a museum of customs and household utensils, as shown by the artist "Mutt". The *Ready-made* is employed to shoot through the denotation horizon the recipient invariably must possess -- the sign continuum constituting meaning -- by way of a second or third semantic connexion. No big surprise that Dada, and foremost its Superdada Duchamp, signalize the beginning of surrealism.

<sup>7</sup> If at all, Yves Klein's monochrome paintings are most suited to be understood as *things* (in themselves). In fact, the physical substrate, which to us for example appears blue, is the central point. The peripheral system of the eye is confronted with it and reacts to the physicalness in a physically, neurologically stimulating way. Out of this may grow the impression of the unbearable (M Rothko, B. Newman, all of Op Art belongs here).



for decades. At the very latest since M. Bense introduced inversion (dualization) of sign thematics, with the gain of the "Seinsthematiken" ascribed to their corresponding sign thematics, the ontological approach which had been ignored -- perhaps one should mention as an excuse, for scientific-historical, systematic reasons -- when taking medieval objects as the central question of art science, especially relating to the art of the 20th Century, must receive special consideration. I content myself to make reference to the basic elements and elaborations by M. Bense (1986), so lucidly explicated by U. Bayer. (Bayer, 1989)

III. I take up the view of Odo Marquardt who holds that art in contemporary society is to be comprehended as a means of compensation (Marquardt, 1989), wherefore art (as compensate) develops further in proportion to progress in a mainly technically dominated culture. This thought I intend to link up with the maxim of Nouveau Réalisme: "A thing is that what it is"; with Dewey's "Art is the quality of doing" (Dewey, 1934); with: "The means, however, are the thing itself, the whole." (Müller, 1990)

I discussed "a thing is that what it is" in previous papers under the aspect that art as means of communication, i.e. as sign, cannot be introduced with the maxim quoted. (Brög + Stiebing, 1980). This, of course, presupposes that relationless somethings, that signlessness cannot exist in consciousness at all. If one assumes that contents of consciousness are principally of a triadic-relational nature, this view cannot be upheld. But the question remains: what is it that the Nouveau Réalist artist is producing, if he negates art to be conceptive, if he, in his speech, negates the production of art? If one proceeds from the fact which is claimed of Nouveau Réalisme artefacts, that they are *things* and nothing else, and if one further assumes that these *things* conceptively also belong to consciousness, then one can interpret the maxim "a thing is that what it is" in the way that there are signs, but signs of lesser semioticity.

A separate discussion would be necessary regarding the conditions of mediating a *thing* which is what it is without essentially changing in consciousness this claimed status. It may be presumed that the main theme of Nouveau Réalisme regarding art is based on the idea that *somethings* were separated from consciousness or were repairable. However, if one maintains that reality (*things, something*) must be mediated to consciousness (Bayer, 1989), and believes that thematizing the complete object in the reality thematics 2.1 2.2 2.3 to be the perfect example for

mediating reality, then it clearly shows that, based on the participation of all three fundamental categories, (total) discretion between reality and consciousness may not be assumed. This becomes especially lucid when the three fundamental categories are identified with the modalities *possibility* (Firstness), *reality* (Secondness), and *necessity* (Thirdness).

When we speak of lesser semioticity, we speak of signs of the sign class 3.1 2.1 1.1, i.e. of signs which point through their homogeneous rank of sub-signs to the fact that the trichotomic Firstness of the triadic sign composition was in each instance realized. The inverse reality thematics.1.1 1.2 1.3 shows as complete thematization of the medium the peripheral position between reality and its mediation in consciousness and confirms the low semioticity. In opposition to this, signs of the reality thematics 2.1 2.2 2.3 are the highest possible representative of reality. In the reconstruction of the sign class 3.2 2.2 1.2, we have the class of the most dense representative of reality. The monochrome paintings of Yves Klein, demonstrating quality as blueness, as a certain quality of blueness, come closest to the sign status of lesser semioticity. Thus, these artefacts, and this is remarkable at first sight, drop out of the class of self-reality (sign class and reality thematics coincide) and thus do not belong to the class of aesthetic objects as defined by Bense (1986, 1987, 1988). Also, the singularly existing signs with total thematizing of medium (as reality thematics) occupy an extreme rank within the sphere between reality and its semiotic mediation for consciousness, as does the sign class as a whole. They mark the lowest level of transition from reality to mediating semioticity. Reference to reality is represented merely by rank 2, the 2nd sub-sign of reality thematics, of the reality thematics 1.1 1.2 1.3 of the complete medium reached by inversion of the sign class 3.1 2.1 1.1.

"... the actual semiotic function of the representing mediation by another has not yet been achieved." (Bayer, 1987) However, it should not be overlooked that also this extreme factor shares consciousness. Rank 3 of the 3rd sub-sign (1.3) points to Peirce's 3rd fundamental category, that of consciousness.

With this assertion, I oppose the trivial view that everything which finds acceptance as art within the accepted social framework must also be justified as art on a semiotical, fundamental basis. The slated position does not at all exclude the meaning which signs outside the class of self-reality may have for art science, in aesthetics, and in art practice.

It must be emphasized that social conditions exist which lead to an aesthetic reception of *things, matters*, of Nouveau Réalisme. The declared will not to produce art is ignored by dealing with this declared non-art, and this is demonstrated daily by way of dealing with it as well as by appropriating it in the true, the material sense of the word. Here, we find the semantic rule in force, which we could previously put to the point by taking into the art museum medieval cult objects and exhibiting *Ready-mades*.<sup>8</sup>

I find it reasonable to add a few thoughts regarding "art is quality of doing" (Dewey, 1934). This quotation was in its abbreviated and isolated form cause and legitimation for *Action Painting*. As far as our discussion here is concerned, it is not necessary to generate the philosophical pragmatic behaviouristic context. Also, I do not wish to indict *action* as process and thus discuss *action* as an artistic quality and therewith transpose it from *materia potentialis* to *materia actualis*. No doubt, *materia actualis* is always also *materia formalis* but I wish the material proofs, extensional traces of past *action*, to be the subject. These manifest materializations are for me close to the artefacts of Nouveau Réalisme. If in Nouveau Réalisme the artefact is claimed as *thing* and thus the sign character negated, the attempts through which Action Painting and related trends were most radically realized showed that there was an attempt to at least minimize, if not exclude, conscious acts during creation. This is true for the stochastic-automatistic processes of creation we know from J. Pollock, J. Appell, K. O. Götz, Sonderborg, particularly from H. Michaux, and from many others. The "thinking hand" of H. Hartung was dismissed as mediator between consciousness and involuntary motoricity. The artefacts of Nouveau Réalisme and of earlier Action Painting are linked by absence of consciousness, which was a central aim. This means that in the works of the action painters a borderline value was fixed on the curve between reality and its mediation or communicability, and this is the value we already worked out for Nouveau Réalisme:

| sign class/sign thematics |     |     |   | reality thematics |     |     |
|---------------------------|-----|-----|---|-------------------|-----|-----|
| 3.1                       | 2.1 | 1.1 | x | 1.1               | 1.2 | 1.3 |

<sup>8</sup> "Any something" may not only through convention be thus established, to deal with it aesthetically, but also through an act of willpower. Michael Stiebing writes in his paper "Die Semiose von der Natur zur Kunst" (Stiebing, 1981): "An act of willpower may be imagined which views nature -- by circumventing all cultural processes -- directly as art, i.e. by simultaneously, negating all parameters inherent in natural objects, and thus declaring them to be art objects, ...". That which is said regarding natural objects is principally true for all objects of any kind.

Of course, singular realizations are to be differentiated semiotically, since it is their "singular *reality*" as "existing being" which is represented by 1.1 (qualisign), 1.2 (sinsign) or 1.3 (legisign) (Bense, 1988). Artefacts of *Nouveau Réalisme* and artefacts of *Action Painting* belong -- possessing each a respective semiotic-aesthetic character -- to the same class, while this class, this should once more be emphasized, is not in *itself* the class of self-reality, i.e. the class of the *aesthetic objects* (signs) *themselves*<sup>9</sup>. The medium, however, is the thing itself, the whole (Müller, 1990). Naturally, the term medium has not been taken from semiotics but from the terminology of the theory of pictorial means. Pictorial means are constituents of works of art/aesthetic objects. Means of a material repertory available by selection. If medium is understood in a semiotic way, this would signify that medium is art, -- after all, the quotation was formulated with regard to works of art. Again, we are faced by the sign thematics 3.1 2.1 1.1 with complete thematizing of medium as reality thematics: 1.1 1.2 1.3.

This is irrespective of the fact that the quotation employed here was formulated without semiotic knowledge and without the ability to see the consequences. If the words are brought to a semiotic point, it makes sense in connection with Marquardt's view of the ultimate aim of art in spe.

III -- Dark future -- prognosis --

In linking both authors, *compensatory works* may be imagined which are nothing else but a medium. As we found out, however, and as it could not be thought more extremely within semiotics, this is only possible within the sign class 3.1 2.1 1.1 and the complementary inversion 1.1 1.2 1.3. But the existing singular "compensatory works of art" will be represented exclusively by 1.1 (quali-sign) (Bense, 1988). It is reasonable that recipients take these signs of lesser semioticity which in the context of interpretation also means total *openness*, as a glance at the subsign 3.1 of

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<sup>9</sup> When Ynhui Park quotes I. Derrida: "The thing itself is a sign" and emphasizes in this context that Derrida "identifies reality with our lingual signs", one can only understand this to mean that a thing, if indeed it exists -- for example outside of our consciousness --, has passed on account of its mediation into complete sign-ness, and no longer contains any share in reality. On p. 50, p. 29 ff. U. Bayer answered Park from a fundamental - categorical, semiotical new point on the topic of the relations of reality, and consciousness. If I refer to this replication here, it is because Bayer's view must be held respective to any given artefact. Artefacts of *Nouveau Réalisme* as well as the artefacts of *Action Painting*, possessing optimal representation of reality, are to be characterized by the reality thematics 1.1 1.2 1.3, and the opposite artefacts of higher semioticity, for example *Concrete Art*, are determined by the reality thematics 3.1 3.2 3.3.

the sign thematics shows as disposable medium. The essential sign is set by the recipient. There is nothing to decode but much to make a mystery of; to recognize in these "quasi-signs" that which one wishes to see. This is the setting of signs; the compensatory effect consists of this.

IV. The production of material means of semiotically weakest representation is the artistic problem of our time and in our society. The place of aesthetic objects of the duality-(inversion)-identical class of self-reality 3.1 2.2 1.3 x 3.1 2.2 1.3 is in this way substituted. The substitute must satisfy the demand to be different from that which is technical culture in a wide sense. This "art" does not play its role as a model of the improbable in the sense of a counter-model to predictable processes of nature. This art is rather to be seen as predictable counter-model to a driving and (still) bearing, less predictable, technically dominated contemporary culture.

The outlines of a culture appear which depends on tolerance of an oppositional, however system-stabilizing, element, and on assisting it in finding broad acceptance.

Any given *some things*, as long as of human origin and, from the view point of the recipient, representing the *impression* of completeness and, from the view point of the producer, not seeming to be products of alienated labor, shall be received as signs. This "art" will be introduced by appropriate handling, behaviour, modes of reception, as have been so far developed in dealing with art.

*Compensatory art* does not require proof of aestheticity.

V. A semiotical-ontological view of the continuum art is to be taken, leaving the horizon of "stuff" (medieval art), entering the sphere of "the age of art", declining behind a horizon of *things*, the results of action qualities, and moving forwards the disposable means of so-called *compensatory art*.

Hegel was able to spread cultural pessimism and hold the opinion that the problems of art would be submerged by the knowledge gained from research, science, and technology. But the contrary is the case. Artists and art increase. The explanation is quite simple: "Knowledge, security, comfort et cetera through research, science and technology are indeed welcome, but they demand a loss of completeness of cognition and experience, and are paid for in alienated labor. Man in

contemporary society is exposed to both experiences -- cum grano salis. The deficits experienced call for compensation.

## Notes

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Internationale Zeitschrift für  
Semiotik und Ästhetik  
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